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Procurement projects often encounter unanticipated problems.  Deadlines and penalties are one important
instrument used to incentivize contractors to adapt their plans. We develop a theory of highway procurement
in which contractors must modify their construction rate following a productivity shock.  We model
how time incentives affect the work rate and time taken, characterizing the efficient contract design.
Using new micro-level data from Minnesota that includes day-by-day information on work plans,
actual outcomes and delays, we find strong evidence supporting the theory.  As an application, we
build an econometric model that endogenizes adaptation, and simulate how different incentive structures
affect outcomes and the variance of contractor payments.  Accounting for the traffic delays caused


















An online appendix is available at:
http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w176471 Introduction
Public procurement is big business. The European Commission estimated in 2002 that
it amounted to 16.3% of the European Union's GDP (European Commission 2004). This
fraction is typical of many developing and developed countries: for example, the World Bank
assessed the share in South Africa to be 13% of GDP in 2003 (World Bank 2003). In the
United States, highway construction in particular has recently received increased funding
through a 6-month, $19.9 billion extension of the existing surface transportation bill.1
For many procurement activities, cost and outcome uncertainty is unavoidable. In highway
construction, bad weather, unexpected site conditions, poor planning or materials delays
can quickly derail a project. When such shocks arise, the question is how contractors will
adapt their plans. This depends on the incentives provided by the procurement contract. In
cost-plus contracts, where the government pays the contractor's costs plus a xed fee, it may
be easy for the parties to agree on an ex-post ecient plan. By contrast, in a xed-price
contract where there is no cost sharing, the contractor will only adapt if the contract gives
him private incentives to do so, or if the contract is renegotiated. Bajari and Tadelis (2001)
have argued that the cost-plus design is therefore preferable when adaptation is likely to be
necessary, renegotiation is costly, and the cost of specifying a complete contract to cover all
possible contingencies is high.
An important distinction lies between shocks that require a whole new project design (i.e.
for both parties to adapt), and those that require only the contractor to adapt his plans for
executing the old design. In the latter case of one-sided adaptation, project deadlines can in
principle eectively substitute for more detailed contracts, by giving the contractor a private
incentive to re-optimize their plans whatever state of nature arises.
In this paper, we examine whether time incentives are eective for motivating adaptation in
practice. We consider data from state highway construction projects in Minnesota. Several
features make this an attractive case study. First, many highway construction activities are
relatively routine, with well-specied designs that rarely need to be adapted. Second, our
dataset is unusually large and rich, containing day-by-day reports by the project engineers
on weather conditions, delays, and planned and actual work hours. This allows us to identify
unanticipated shocks by looking at how much work was actually required to complete the
project, relative to the initial plans. Finally, highway construction is an area where adap-
1Source: American Highway Users Alliance.
1tation really matters. When contractors overrun their deadline by 10 days, commuters are
inconvenienced by 10 more days of trac delays. With trac on a typical state highway
in Minnesota exceeding 10,000 vehicles per day, a 5 minute delay to each motorist over a
10 day period amounts to a welfare loss of $100,000, when we value their time at $12/hr.
It may be more socially ecient for the contractor to adopt 16-hour workdays rather than
continue at the old pace and nish late.
We reach two main conclusions. First, we nd that contractors do indeed adapt their work
rates in response to construction shocks in order to meet project deadlines. Consistent with
the model we develop, we show that such adaptation is limited: for shocks that would require
an increase in work rate of an hour per day to meet the deadline, rms tend to increase their
work rate by less than half an hour per day. This is not surprising given the weak penalties
in Minnesota.
Second, we show that higher penalties would in this case be more eective in improving
joint welfare than tighter deadlines. To reach this conclusion, we structurally estimate the
contractor's time-related costs. Our approach uses the rst order condition from our model
that equates the marginal benet and marginal cost of a change in the work rate. The
marginal benets of speedier construction depend on whether the contract would nish late
if the work rate was left unchanged, and on the daily penalties for late completion. These
penalties are specied by state regulations, and vary with contract size and year. Given this
exogenous variation in marginal benets, we can use the rst order condition to back out
the marginal costs. We can then infer the counterfactual completion time under dierent
incentive structures. Combining this with estimates of the externality from trac delays,
we can compare dierent policies on welfare grounds.
We nd that for an average $1.3 million contract, the change in joint welfare from setting
a 10% tighter construction deadline is less than $7,000. By contrast, switching to penalties
equal to 10% of the trac delay cost would raise joint welfare by almost $40,000 per contract.
We also examine the fully ecient policy, which is a \lane rental" in which the contractor
must pay the full trac delay cost for each day of construction. This has far bigger eects
| welfare increases by $400,000 per contract | but is also rather out of sample, and thus
hard to evaluate.
Our work quanties the natural complementarity between deadlines and penalties: without
high penalties, contractors respond little to tighter deadlines. Because the social costs of
2construction vary so much across highway projects, we also argue for tailored penalties,
rather than the \one-size-ts-all" approach of statewide contract specications.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst empirical paper on the relationship between
ex-ante incentives and adaptation in procurement. Early work largely took the form of
theory papers emphasizing the role of asymmetric information and moral hazard (McAfee
and McMillan (1986), Laont and Tirole (1986), Laont and Tirole (1987)). More recent
papers focused on analyzing the incentive properties of commonly observed contract forms
and arrangements (see for example Bajari and Tadelis (2001), Levin and Tadelis (2010),
Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2009), Martimort and Pouyet (2008) and Maskin and Tirole
(2008)). Issues of adaptation, contractual completeness and renegotiation often arise.
There have been a number of empirical papers analyzing highway procurement in particular
(see for example Porter and Zona (1993), Hong and Shum (2002), Bajari and Ye (2003), Jofre-
Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), Krasnokutskaya (2009), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2010),
Li and Zheng (2009), Marion (2007), De Silva, Dunne, Kankanamge and Kosmopoulou
(2008), Gil and Marion (2009)). Some have focused on the bidding process, emphasizing
features such as the potential for collusion, and preferential treatment of local and small
contractors. Others have been concerned with measurement, developing procedures for non-
parametric identication of valuations under dynamics or unobserved heterogeneity. One
closely related empirical paper is Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis (2007), which analyzes how
private information on ex-post materials requirements can lead to ex-ante bidding distortions
under unit bidding. Another is Lewis and Bajari (2011), where we examined the use of
scoring auctions to award contracts based on both time and price.
More broadly, this paper forms part of the empirical literature on high-powered incentives
and their eects on output, which has mainly focused on labor contracts within the rm (see
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Prendergast (1999), Lazear (2000) and Bandiera, Barankay and
Rasul (2005)). Finally, a recent literature in public economics has focused on \bunching" at
kink points in the tax structure (Saez 2010, Chetty, Friedman, Olsen and Pistaferri 2011).
The discontinuity in penalties at the project deadline generates similar \bunching" in our
analysis | see Figure 4 | though our econometric approach diers.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the highway procurement
process. Sections 3, 4 and 5 respectively contain the theoretical, descriptive and policy
analysis. Section 6 concludes. All tables are to be found in the appendix.
32 The Highway Construction Process
Building or repairing a highway is a complex activity. Here, we emphasize key features of
the process in Minnesota that inform our later modeling choices. Figure 1 gives a simple
timeline, starting from when the contract is awarded. At that time, the winning contractor
must post a \contract bond" guaranteeing the completion of the contract according to the
design specication. This bond is typically secured through a third party who will take on
the contractor's obligations in the event of default.
Once the contract is awarded, the contractor must plan how to structure the various distinct
activities, such as excavation or grading, that make up the construction project. To do
this, they work out how long each activity will take for a standard crew size, and then use
sophisticated software to work out the optimal sequence to complete the activities in by
using the \critical path method" (Clough, Sears and Sears 2005). The key feature of this
technique is that some activities are designated as critical, and must be completed on time
to avoid delay, while others are o the critical path and have some time slack. The critical
activities are called the \project controlling operations" (PCOs).
The contractor presents his plan to the project engineer in the pre-construction meeting. It
is considered good practice to choose a plan that allows some contingency time on the side
(around 5% of the time allowed). But a busy contractor may select a plan that allows little or
no margin for error, or alternatively plan to nish early and move onto another project. This
will obviously be aected by the time incentives that are oered. In Minnesota the incentives
are usually simple. The design engineer initially species a number of \working days" that
the contractor is allowed to take to complete the contract. A \working day" is a day on
which the contractor could reasonably be expected to work. Usually this means weekdays
(excluding public holidays) with amenable weather conditions. When the contractor works,
a working day is charged. When the contractor could have worked, but didn't, a working
day is charged and a note is made of the hours of \avoidable delay". Finally, when work was
not possible, a working day is not charged, and \unavoidable delays" are noted.
Each additional day beyond the number of target working days is charged as a day late.
The penalties for being late are specied in the standard contract specications, which we
reproduce in Table 1. Each day late incurs a constant penalty which depends only on the
size of the contract. The penalties were last increased in 2005. So the contractor has no














Figure 1: Construction Process
Once the planning is complete, the construction begins. During the process, the project
engineer conducts random checks on the quality of the materials and monitors whether ev-
erything is completed according to the planned specications. Productivity shocks, materials
delays or unexpected site conditions may aect the rate at which any activity is completed,
and the contractor must continually check progress against the planned time path. If neces-
sary, the work rate may need to be amended, especially when there is delay on a critical path
activity. At the end of the process, the contractor is paid the amount bid less any damages
assessed for late completion.
3 Model
With this process in mind, we outline a model of adaptation under time incentives. Con-
tractors have private costs that depend on the amount of capital and the size of the work
crew they employ, as well as on the number of hours per day they choose to work. Road
construction inicts a negative externality on commuters, so the ecient outcome requires
accelerated construction relative to the private optimum. Faster construction in turn re-
quires either increased scale (more capital and labor) or an increased work rate. We assume
that the scale is determined at the start of the project, so that as productivity shocks occur,
the rm can only adapt to those shocks by changing their work rate. We want to know
how time incentives aect such adaptation, and what implications this has for the socially
ecient contract design.
We begin by modeling the production technology using a two-period model. In the rst
period, the contractor chooses a level of capital K, representing all the factors of production
that will be xed over the length of the project (hired equipment, project manager etc).
They also x the labor L. Following this, a shock  is realized. This shock is anything that
was unanticipated about the amount of work needed to complete the project. For simplicity,
5we will refer to it as a productivity shock below. Given K, L and , the project takes
H(K;L;) man-hours to complete.
In the second period, the rm chooses a uniform work rate h (in hours per day).2 This
in turn determines the number of days d = H(K;L;)=hL the project will take, since the
number of man-hours of work completed each day is just hL. We impose some economically
motivated restrictions on the total hours H(K;L;). Capital substitutes for labor, decreasing
the number of man hours required (HK < 0). Labor has declining marginal product, so that
adding additional labor increases the number of man hours required (HL > 0), though
decreasing the number of days taken for a xed work rate ( @
@Ld(K;L;;h) < 0). Last, a
good productivity shock corresponds to a low  (H > 0).
The work-rate decision will be inuenced by the time incentives laid out in the contract.
We consider time incentives that take the following form: a target completion date dT
and a penalty cD for each day late. These form of incentives are widely used in highway
procurement; other forms of time incentives are called \innovative". One innovative design
is the \lane rental" contract. In this design, the contractor pays a rental rate for each day of
construction that closes a lane. For construction jobs that require continuous lane closure,
this is a special case with a deadline of dT = 0 and lane rental rate cD.
The contractor is risk-neutral, and pays daily rental rates of r per unit of capital, and an
hourly wage w(h) to each worker. For algebraic simplicity, the wage function w(h) is assumed
to take the linear form w(h) = w + bh, a base wage plus an increment that depends on the
work rate, reecting overtime, bonuses for night-time work etc. Overall the contractor's
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Trac delay costs are assumed to be linear in the days taken, with the daily cost equal
to a constant cT. Calculating this externality as the product of the delay, the amount of
trac and the average time value of commuters, linearity is a good approximation if trac
and delays are constant over time. Realistically, trac delay costs should vary with trac
2Provided the wage rate w(h) given below is weakly convex, a uniform work rate will be weakly preferable
to a more complex construction schedule.
6patterns both within and across days, and also with the extent to which construction impedes
commuters (e.g. are commuters still delayed when construction ceases for the day?). Here
we simplify by assuming that the trac delay costs are independent of the work rate h.
Discussion: We have assumed that the productivity shock is realized before the work rate
decision is made, so that the contractor can choose when the contract will be completed. An
alternative would be to make the contractor decide on his work rate before the productivity
shock is realized, so that the completion time is stochastic. Both of these are imperfect
approximations to a more complex dynamic process. The latter timing assumption is closer
to the standard principal-agent models in the theory literature, where the agent chooses
an eort level that induces a distribution of (contractible) outcomes. The advantage for us
of modeling completion times as deterministic is that we are able to explain why a large
fraction of contracts in our data nish exactly on time | because the contractor chooses to
nish on time! By contrast, the other model would require that contractors plan to nish
on time and that there is a \zero shock" atom, and as we will show, this is not the case.
We have also assumed the contractor is risk-neutral. This assumption is innocuous for most
of the analysis, since we work with the ex-post prot function to see how incentives aect
adaptation. But for the welfare analysis at the end of this section, the ex-ante joint welfare
will vary with the contractor's risk preferences. We discuss the implications of alternative
models at that time.
Finally, we assume that the quality of the construction is unaected by the time incentives.
One may worry that the contractor may shirk on quality to save time. This is a version of the
famous multi-tasking problem of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). In highway procurement,
this is less of a concern, as the government employs a project engineer to monitor the
construction and ensure that the nished project meets the contract specications. Low
quality construction is penalized by additional penalties laid out in the contract terms, and
these penalties can be enforced against the contract bond.3
Adaptation: We start the analysis by looking at how the work rate h is chosen, given the
realization of the productivity shock. Taking a rst-order condition in h, and dealing with
3Lewis and Bajari (2011) found that there was almost no dierence in the quality penalties charged
between highway construction contracts auctioned using scoring auctions (which emphasize cost and time)























Figure 2: Optimal Work Rates. The gure depicts how work rates change with the number
of hours of work required to complete the project. In the left panel, a favorable productivity shock
means that a slow work rate would suce for on-time completion, but the contractor works faster
to economize on capital costs and will nish early. The middle panel shows a contract where
no productivity shock has occurred, and the contractor works at a rate that leads to on-time
completion. In the right panel, a negative productivity shock implies a fast work rate is necessary
for on-time completion, but the contractor optimally chooses to work slower and will nish late.
various boundary issues resulting from the presence of the max operator in the objective
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It is easiest to see what's going on here in a picture. There are three cases, corresponding
to contracts in which the required work rate for on-time completion H()=dT is low (good
productivity draws), those where it is intermediate (average productivity draws), and those
where is it high (poor productivity draws). These cases are depicted in Figure 2 as the left,
middle and right panels, respectively. When the contract is unexpectedly easy to complete,
the contractor could work slowly and still complete on time, avoiding the wage premium
for accelerated work. The countervailing incentive is that this ties up capital over a longer




is increasing in the rental rate and the capital-labor ratio, and decreasing in the slope of the
wage premium. On the other hand, given a middling draw, the contractor chooses a work
rate that allows on-time completion (h = H=dT), since accelerating to be early is too costly,
8and slowing down to be late incurs time penalties. Finally, when facing a poor productivity
shock, the contractor chooses a work rate of h =
q
rK+cD
bL and nishes late. Higher time
penalties imply faster work rates in this case.
So the contractor adapts his work rate in line with the productivity shocks, although the
range of adaptation is bounded. Specically, for xed capital and labor, there are a range








, and in that range, the contractor will accelerate or
decelerate work as needed to keep production on time. But no positive productivity shock
could induce a slower work rate than rK
bL , nor could a suciently negative one induce him to
work faster than
rK+cD
bL . To reduce construction time even after bad shocks, one needs high
penalties cD. These increase the maximum work rate of the contractor.
One important caveat to this analysis is that it is short-run, in that we are holding the
capital and labor inputs xed. If the procurer were to consistently oer more aggressive
time incentives, contractors would learn to use more capital or labor than is standard, in
order to get the jobs done faster. Indeed the evidence presented in Lewis and Bajari (2011)
suggests that when high-powered time incentives are oered, the contractors may be willing
to adopt entirely non-standard work schedules, signing costly rush orders for inputs, using
big work crews, and working 24 hours a day. These long-run changes can only reduce their
costs below the short-run levels. Since we never see such high-powered incentives in the data,
our entire analysis will focus on the short-run.
Welfare Analysis: We now look at how standard contracts and lane rentals compare
in terms of welfare outcomes. For this, it is useful to separate the time incentives from
the contractor's other costs (capital rental and wages), and look at how much money the
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We refer to this as the marginal benet of delay. It is strictly decreasing in d. The interpre-
tation is that while an extra day of construction is useful to a contractor facing a tight work
schedule (low d), it is not worthwhile when the pace of construction is already rather slow.




















Figure 3: Completion Time in Lane Rentals and Standard Contracts. Both panels
depict the marginal benet to delay curve  c0(d;), drawn for three dierent productivity shocks.
In the left panel, a lane rental contract imposes a constant cost of delay cD, so the contractor
optimally completes at d
0;d
1 and d
2 respectively, in each case equating marginal benet and cost
of delay. In the right panel, the incentive structure is standard, with damages charged after the
target completion time dT. In all cases the contractor will optimally complete exactly on time.
time. The left panel shows the marginal benet of delay curves for three dierent productivity
shocks under a lane rental contract. Here the contractor faces a daily penalty of cD right
from day one, and thus the incentive structure is at. Prot maximization implies that he
equate the marginal costs and benets of delay, and so for each shock i he completes at d
i.
If the rental rate is set equal to the daily trac delay costs cT, the contractor internalizes
the negative externality inicted by the construction, and the social planner's problem is
identical to that faced by the contractor. Accordingly, the contractor will hire capital and
labor to minimize expected social costs (the sum of private and trac delay costs), and
eciently choose the work rate given the realization of the productivity shock. Ex-post,
the input choices may be sub-optimal, as they are not perfectly adapted to the productivity
shock, but this is unavoidable given the timing.
The right panel of Figure 3 shows the same benet curves under the standard incentive
structure. Before the target date dT, the contractor has no marginal cost of an extra day,
since this is not penalized at all. But after the target, each additional day taken attracts
cD in time penalties, and therefore the marginal costs of delay jump discontinuously from
zero to cD at dT. In the gure this implies that for all three dierent productivity shocks
the contractor will complete exactly on time. There is no incentive to complete early, as
delay remains valuable; but also no reason to be late, as delay is not suciently worthwhile
to oset the time penalties. This implies that completion times should be \sticky" at the
target date: we should see many contracts nishing exactly on time.
10In contrast to the simple lane rental design, the standard contract design will almost certainly
lead to inecient outcomes. The contractor should eciently adapt to dierent productiv-
ity shocks by choosing dierent completion times, but the wedge in incentives makes this
privately sub-optimal. In addition, there's little incentive to hire additional capital or labor
at the planning stage to increase the probability of quick completion, since nishing early is
not rewarded. This makes it dicult for the procurer to design a good incentive structure.
On the one hand, setting cD = cT at least ensures ecient adaptation for bad productivity
draws (it sets the right penalty). But it may be preferable to distort short-run incentives
with cD > cT, setting unreasonably high penalties. This increases the ex-ante incentive to
hire additional capital, and thereby gives the contractor ex-post incentives to nish quickly.
This is a second-best solution, creating a short-run distortion to oset a long-run distortion.
This analysis is similar to Weitzman (1974) on regulating a rm with unknown costs of com-
pliance. The twist in this two-period model is that the contractor is also ex-ante uncertain,
and only learns his costs after the incentive structure has been chosen. The lane rental is
essentially a Pigouvian tax, and remains ecient in an ex-ante sense. The standard design
is like a quota, and has the usual problem that the regulator has to set it without knowing
the underlying costs of the contractor. This leads to ineciency.
Risk Aversion: An alternative way to look at this problem is to use a standard principal-
agent model (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987). In that model, the contractor is risk-averse,
his \eort" is his work rate, the output is the number of days taken, and the productivity
shock is the source of output uncertainty. The work rate is non-contractible and the shock
unobserved, so that the procurer can contract only on completion time as usual. As we know
from that literature, it is no longer optimal to transfer all the risk to the contractor by using
the ecient lane rental: giving such high-powered incentives in the presence of productivity
shocks increases the variance of the contractor's payments, lowering their expected utility.
Weaker incentives are to be preferred here.
It is hard to assess how important risk aversion is in describing contractor's preferences,
although papers on skew bidding suggest that they are at least partially risk averse (Athey
and Levin 2001, Bajari et al. 2007). Since we cannot analyze this case without making
specic functional form assumptions on the contractor's utility, we assume risk neutrality
throughout the empirical analysis. We also report how dierent policies aect the standard
deviation of the contractor's payments, so that the reader can assess the impact on risk.
114 Descriptive Analysis
The theory outlined above indicates how contractors should adapt to productivity shocks,
and how such adaptation is mediated by the contract design. In the remainder of the
paper, we analyze data from contracts let by the Minnesota Department of Transportation
(Mn/DOT). Our dataset is unusually detailed, as it includes daily reports by the project
engineer on how construction is progressing. This enables us to test the theory, seeing
if contractors adapt their work rate in response to productivity shocks, and exhibit the
\stickiness" in completion times predicted by the model. Having shown that the theory is
largely conrmed, we estimate the contractor's short-run cost curves and use these to run
some counterfactual simulations of alternative policies, such as lane rentals.
4.1 The Data
We obtained data from Mn/DOT on all the highway procurement contracts completed in
Minnesota during the period 1996-2006. The main data source is the project engineer's own
reports on the progress of each project, which are recorded in a program called FieldOps. We
refer to this as the \diary data". From these les, we learn how many hours the contractor
worked each day, how many hours of work were initially planned, how many hours of avoid-
able or unavoidable delays were recorded, what the weather conditions were like, and what
the current project controlling operation was. We also see how working days were charged,
and therefore can deduce whether the project nished early or late. A secondary data source
is the bidding abstracts, which detail what the contract is and where it is located, who bid
and what amount they bid, as well as the project engineer's initial cost estimate.
The full sample includes contracts with missing data or non-standard time incentives, and
projects that do not require lane closure, and therefore are unlikely to signicantly impact
commuters. We drop these observations, to end up with a sample of 490 contracts. One
variable that is not in the data and thus needs to be constructed for the welfare analysis
is an estimate of the daily trac delay cost. We calculated a contract-specic measure
by multiplying the average daily trac around the construction location by an estimate
of the time value of commuters ($12/hour), and a conservative estimate of the delay that
construction will cause them. Because estimating the delay required detailed manual work
on Google Maps, we constructed these estimates only for a subsample of 99 contracts (the
12delay subsample). More details on both sample selection and the estimation of the trac
delay costs are available in the data appendix.
We present summary statistics on the contracts in Table 2. A typical contract has value
just over $1.3 million, and is of relatively short duration, on average 40 days. During the
contract, contractors work for 432 hours, an average work rate of 10.15 hours a day. A
substantial number of both avoidable and unavoidable delays are recorded. Contracts are
generally completed on time, although in the event that they are completed late, damages
are assessed in only 24% of cases. This is because the project engineer has discretion over
when to assess penalties. Damages, when assessed, range from $500 to as high as $29,000.
In Table 1, we present detailed summary statistics on completion time. Smaller contracts
are more likely to nish early or on time than larger contracts. In fact, none of the contracts
of size less than $100,000 nish late, perhaps reecting the fact that the penalties in these
contracts are a larger fraction of the total contract value.
Most of the contracts in our sample involve some resurfacing work (nearly 90%), which will
require lane closure. The next biggest category is the construction of turn lanes and other
work on road shoulders. From this we project an average daily trac delay cost of around
$15,000, arising from a 10 minute delay to 12,000 commuters.
4.2 Shocks and Adaptation
We use this data to see how contractors adapt to productivity shocks. We construct a
measure of the shock  by comparing the total hours needed to complete the project H with
the number of hours initially planned HP. As bigger contracts will naturally attract bigger




A histogram of the normalized shocks e  is shown in the left panel of Figure 4. Shocks
are almost symmetric around zero, so that positive and negative shocks are equally likely.
Moreover, the shocks can be quite big: the standard deviation is 4.6 hours of work per day,
compared with an average workday of 9.6 hours. To see how these shocks aect the work
rate, we regress the work rate on the planned work rate, the normalized shock and normalized
penalty, and other covariates. One of these is a dummy for whether the contractor is a big
13rm, dened by having won more than $10 million in contracts over the sample period;
another is a dummy for the contractor being located in Minnesota.
h = 0h
P + 1e  + 2
cD
dT + x + " (4)
The rst two columns of Table 3 present the results of these OLS regressions. We nd
a positive and signicant relationship: when a contract requires an extra hour of work
per day to remain on-time, the contractor only works around half an hour more each day.
This implies that the contract will nish late. This is consistent with the theory shown in
Figure 2: there is only partial adjustment for particularly big or small shocks. The coecient
on time penalties is positive, though statistically insignicant. This may be because the time
incentives only matter for contracts which experience negative productivity shocks. As we'll
see below, the time incentives do appear to bind on these contracts.
There may be a reverse causality problem here, in that when contractors work at a faster rate
the contract may actually take more hours to complete (diminishing returns). In that case
the shock e  and error " may be correlated. We address this with instrumental variables (IV)
regression. Specically, we instrument for the shock with the number of hours of rain and
snow each day. Bad weather can aect the number of hours needed to complete a project,
by adversely impacting site conditions. But it has no eect on the optimal work rate except
through the hours required, since no working days are charged when it is raining or snowing
| in other words, it has no impact on the time incentives. The results reported in the last
two columns of Table 3 are qualitatively similar.
4.3 Time Incentives and Completion Times
Having shown that contractors do adapt to productivity shocks, we now consider how the
incentive structure aects this adaptation. Recall that our theory predicts that the contract
completion time will be \sticky" around the deadline, so that many contracts will be com-
pleted exactly on time. Look at the right panel of Figure 4, which is a histogram of the days
late across contracts. In the gure, a contract exactly on time has been added to the bin
to the left of 0, and so you can see that over 20% of the contracts were completed either
just on time or a day early. This is exactly what the theory predicts: for moderate shocks,
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Figure 4: Shocks and Completion Times. The left panel is a histogram of the \productivity
shock": the dierence between actual hours taken and hours planned, divided by the days allowed.
The histogram in the right panel is of the dierence between actual and contractually specied
completion time in standard contracts. The huge spike just before 0 indicates many contracts
are completed exactly on time, as the theory predicts. Both histograms have a normal density
superimposed.
Comparing the left and right panels of the gure, we note that both are well approximated
by a normal density to the left of the deadline. To the right, the completion times histogram
has \missing" mass. This too is an implication of the theory: for suciently positive shocks,
the contractor nishes early, but given the symmetric negative shock, the penalties may
prompt them to nish on time, thereby removing mass from after the target date.
To examine this formally requires something more sophisticated than linear regression, as
the mass point at zero implies that the conditional mean days taken is not a linear function
of the covariates. We set up such a model in the policy analysis below. But we can still try
answer a basic question: when incentives are bigger, are contractors late less often?
Table 4 shows the result from a linear regression of an indicator for the contract being late
on time penalties and other covariates (the results from a probit are similar). We nd that
contracts with higher penalty rates, relative to days allowed, are signicantly less likely
to be late. The eects are quite big: they imply that for an average contract, doubling the
penalties would reduce the probability that the contract is late by 17%. High-value contracts
are more likely to nish late. Rain and snow are signicant predictors of late completion,
which makes sense because of their impact on site conditions.
These results together are suggestive of a causal eect of disincentives on adaptation. But
the absence of a clean quasi-experiment means that we cannot rule out other explanations.
15For example, perhaps contractors complete on time because there are non-pecuniary costs
of late completion, such as acquiring a poor reputation. Our understanding of the public
procurement process is that reputation doesn't play much of a role, because federal procure-
ment regulations give little discretion for selecting contractors on any basis other than cost
or quality. Nonetheless there could be some other explanation for the mass point.
What we would really like to do is use the discontinuity in incentives around the thresholds in
Table 1 to show that the probability of being late falls discontinuously around those points.
Unfortunately, we have far too few observations to make this practical. So in what follows,
we attribute all of the adaptation that we see in the data to the incentive structure (this is
implicit in the rst order conditions we develop below). This may lead us to overestimate
the responsiveness of contractors to incentives. We try to get a sense of how reasonable our
results are later in the paper.
5 Policy Analysis
Having found evidence that contractors adjust their work rate in order to meet project
deadlines, we would now like to assess dierent policy proposals for alleviating the negative
externality caused by construction. Our strategy for doing this is as follows. We estimate the
contractor's short-run private costs of acceleration by looking at how their behavior changes
as damages vary, using rst order conditions motivated directly by our theoretical model.
With these in hand, we consider simple counterfactual policy changes, including accelerated
targets and higher penalties. Of particular interest is a realistic case in which the lane rental
is a constant fraction of the trac delay cost, which is constrained ecient when the procurer
faces budget constraints.
One important caveat is that our analysis is entirely short-run. What we see in the data
is how contractors adapted to dierent shocks under dierent incentive structures, given
whatever capital and labor choices they had already made. This doesn't tell us how their
input choices might change under a counterfactual policy, and so we are forced to hold
everything constant. Fortunately, the bias can be signed: since long-run costs should be
no more than short-run costs in expectation (since they are solving the same optimization
problem with fewer constraints), we will tend to overestimate contractor acceleration costs,
and therefore underestimate counterfactual welfare gains.
165.1 Estimation of Contractor Costs
Recall from the theory that the contractor acts to equate the marginal benet of delay
 c0(d;) with the marginal costs of delay, which are determined by the time incentives. We
observe both the number of days taken d, and a measure of the shock . We also know the
exact form of the time incentives. What we don't know is the exact form of the marginal
benet of delay function. So we specify a simple parametric form for it:
 c
0(d;) = d
T(x + ") + d +  = d
T(x + e d + e  + ") (5)
where  < 0,  > 0, e d = d=dT, e  = =dT, and "  N(0;2).4
This specication is important for what follows and worth discussing. We assume that
the marginal benets of delay are linear in the days taken d and the shock , and that
the intercept is proportional to the contract target date dT. What we have in mind is that
contracts with a longer duration are typically more labor intensive, and so the benet of delay
in terms of reduced wages scales with the contract length. We also assume that unobservable
benets are normally distributed. These scale, linearity and normality assumptions, although
restrictive, have the advantage of being simple. We will show that we can t the data quite
well despite these restrictions. Nonetheless we will have to be careful about out-of-sample
extrapolation that relies solely on these parametric choices.
The idea behind our estimation approach is to use the rst order conditions from the theory
model developed in the earlier sections.5 This will allow us to account explicitly for the
discontinuity in incentives as the contractor moves from \early" to \late", which produces
the mass of on time completions seen in Figure 4. The rst order conditions must satisfy:
 c
0 (d;) = 0 if d < d
T
 c
0 (d;) = cD if d > d
T (6)
0 <  c
0 (d;) < cD if d = d
T
These say that rms only complete early when their marginal benets to delay reach zero;
4This normal error specication has the disadvantage that for suciently negative draws of e , the marginal
benets of delay may be everywhere negative, which is implausible. Fortunately, given the parameter esti-
mates below, this problem occurs only infrequently in the counterfactual simulations.
5A similar econometric approach was taken in Reiss and White (2005).
17only complete late when their marginal benets to delay equal the cost of delay cD, and
otherwise complete on time. This assumes that rms believe the time penalties will be
charged with certainty. But we see in the data that these penalties are imposed only 25% of
the time. For this reason, we also consider a version of the model where we use a probit to
predict the probability that damages will be charged based on contract characteristics (type
of work, size and duration), and then suppose that contractors believe that damages will be
charged with this probability when making their completion time choice.6
We proceed by maximum likelihood. The conditional log likelihood for each observation,
`i(e djx; e ) is:
`i(e djx; e ) =
8
> > > <





























  log() + log() ; e d > 1
(7)
where  and  denote the standard normal pdf and cdf respectively. The likelihood function
is very similar to that of a censored tobit, except that instead of having a mass point on
one side at the point of censoring, we have a mass point at on-time completion, e d = 1. We
maximize the log likelihood to get coecient estimates, and bootstrap to get standard errors.
Identication: It is worth thinking through how the model is identied. After making the
assumption that marginal benets of delay scale with contract length, we have a considerable
amount of variation in the normalized time penalty cD=dT. This variation pins down the
slope of the marginal benet of delay curve, . Consider for example two similar contracts
that have experienced a similar negative productivity shock, but have dierent normalized
time penalties. Then the extent to which the contractor speeds up in the case with more
costly time penalties tells us how expensive acceleration is, or conversely how valuable delay
is on the margin. Once the slope is pinned down, the intercept of the delay curve x +e  is
identied by the distribution of time outcomes for a given set of covariates and shocks.
One concern is that the slope is identied solely o outcomes for on-time and late contracts:
for example, we never see how much acceleration there would be if a bonus was awarded
for being early. This implies that the marginal benet of delay curve is locally identied
6One problem with this specication is that small contracts are never late in the data, and so in estimating
the enforcement probability for these contracts, we are relying entirely on functional form.
18around the targeted days, but to get marginal benets for e d < 1, we are relying on the linear
functional form. With this in mind, most of our counterfactual simulations require only this
local identication.
Results and Model Fit: Our results are in Table 5. We nd that marginal benets of
delay have signicant and negative slope, and that they are increasing in the size of the
shock. The latter is consistent with the theory in equation (3): when there is more work to
be done, completing on the same schedule would require a higher work rate, and thus higher
wage costs. It follows that delay is more valuable. We also see that contracts with a higher
planned work rate have signicantly higher marginal benets of delay, which makes sense.
In the third and fourth columns we allow the error standard deviation  to vary with the
contract size, specifying that  is a linear function of the log contract value. This is because
in the data smaller contracts have more variable outcomes. For an average contract, which
lasts 40.6 days, our preferred estimate of the marginal benet of delay | given in the third
column of the table | is 10191 9009d, implying that the average marginal benet to delay
with on time completion is $1,182. This compares with an average cost of delay of $1,004,
so that for many contracts the time penalties will actually bite.
The fourth column assumes random rather than full enforcement. As we said earlier, we
predict the probability of enforcement using a probit, and then compare the expected time
penalties to the marginal benets of delay in the rst order condition. None of the observables
is a statistically signicant predictor of enforcement, although there is some evidence that in
bigger contracts enforcement is more lax. When we account for these dierential enforcement
probabilities, we estimate marginal benets to delay that are about a third as large as before,
because with weak enforcement the only reason to nish on time is that the benet of delay
is small.
We also report how a one standard deviation productivity shock aects the marginal benet
of delay. The estimated impact is large: a negative shock of that magnitude raises the delay
benet by $3,233 in our preferred specication. This is larger than the standard deviation
of the error term, implying that the ex-post shocks explain more of the cost dierences than
unobserved factors do.
The model ts quite well, although there are some problems caused by assuming a normal
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Figure 5: Model Fit The gure shows a histogram of the normalized completion times e d in the
data, along with a kernel density estimate of completion times simulated from the structural model.
specication, the full enforcement model of column 3. In Figure 5, we show a histogram
of the normalized completion time against a kernel density plot of the completion times
simulated from the structural model. This is intended as an informal sanity check on the
shape of the distribution.7 The model does a good job of capturing the incentives to be on
time, but slightly under-predicts the probability that a contract will nish just early or just
late, as it needs a large variance term to explain the contracts that nish very late.
A more rigorous test is to compare some sample and predicted moments. We do this in
Table 6. The strengths and weaknesses of the model are quite clear. We do a good job on
predicting how long the contract will take, even conditional on contract size. But the model
over-predicts the fraction of contracts that will be late, and under-predicts how late they will
be conditional on being late. This is probably a consequence of the thin tails of the normal
error distribution. The model does a better job of tting outcomes for big contracts, which
is important for the counterfactuals because these contracts are typically the ones with the
largest time delay costs to commuters.
Finally, we construct a simulated R2 measure for the number of days taken d, by constructing
the total sum of squares TSS =
Pn
i=1(di  ^ E[di])2, residual sum of squares RSS =
Pn
i=1(di 
^ E[dijx;dT;cD;])2 and dening R2 = 1   RSS
TSS as usual. The model does very well on this
measure, explaining 87% of the variance in completion times. For comparison, a simple OLS
regression with the same set of covariates (x;dT;;cD) only achieves an R2 of 66%. This is
7This is informal because we are comparing multiple simulated outcomes for each contract to a single
outcome for each contract in the data.
20encouraging, as it shows that the structural model actually ts better than a simple reduced
form, which need not be the case.
5.2 Counterfactuals
Now that we have contractor costs, we consider four counterfactual policy changes. First,
we consider tightening the deadline to 90% of the current target, without changing the time
penalties. This would be a relatively simple policy to implement. The second policy is more
contract specic: changing the penalties to 10% of the trac delay cost of the contract. This
policy is almost neutral with respect to average penalties: the existing average daily penalty
on a contract in the sub-sample is $1,230, while under this counterfactual policy it would
be $1,520. The third policy is a \lane rental contract", where the contractor pays a penalty
each day from the beginning of the contract. This penalty is set equal to 10% of the trac
delay cost. Finally, the last policy is the (risk-neutral) welfare maximizing policy of a lane
rental with penalty equal to the full trac delay costs.
The last two policies belong to a class of constrained ecient policies that maximize welfare
subject to the constraint that the total costs to the contractors not exceed a certain amount.
All members of this class use lane rentals with penalties equal to a fraction of the trac delay
cost, where the fraction depends on the cost constraint. This class is of interest because
Mn/DOT faces a budget constraint of its own, and any costs it imposes on contractors
through stronger time incentives will be passed-through, possibly at a rate higher than one.
For the simulations, we use the parameter estimates from our preferred specication, given
in column 3 of Table 5. This assumes that contractors expect full enforcement. If we instead
used the partial enforcement estimates for our simulations, the estimated marginal benet of
delay would be lower, and therefore in our simulations contractors would be more responsive
to more aggressive policies. Assuming full enforcement thus leads to conservative estimates
of the welfare gains from such policies.
We simulate both productivity shocks and new error draws in our counterfactuals. We do
this to see how these policies fare when each contract is exposed to a full range of shocks.
The procedure for obtaining the counterfactual estimates is as follows. First, we calculate the
mean counterfactual completion times for each contract by simulating the above draws, and
then compute the mean optimal completion time under the new incentives. This allows us to
calculate the commuter gain from shorter construction, the additional private costs incurred
21by the contractor in accelerating the contract, and the penalties paid by the contractor. In
all cases, these are measured relative to a baseline with no penalties for late completion. We
also calculate a welfare gain, dened as the dierence between the gain to commuters and
the increased costs incurred by contractors. We then average over 10,000 simulations and
across contracts.
The results are in Table 7. We nd that neither of the small tweaks to existing policies has a
big impact on completion times. For example, a tighter deadline implies that the contracts
will on average be completed less than half a day sooner. And for many of the contracts 10%
of the trac delay cost is smaller than the current penalties. As a result, the days taken
actually increases marginally with the new penalties, although it falls with the introduction
of a tighter deadline or a lane rental.
Nonetheless, these more tailored penalties are eective: we see a welfare increase relative
to the current policy of around $51,000 per contract, or about 2.7% of the contract value.
This is due to the large heterogeneity in trac delay costs, which imply that a \one-size-
ts-all" penalty regime does a poor job of aligning social and private costs. It is therefore
not surprising that in the nal column we see large gains to even the 10% lane rental policy,
which aligns incentives not only when the contract is running late, but also when things
are going well. The gains relative to the current policy are nearly $200,000 per contract, or
about 11% of the contract value. The projected gains from the fully ecient lane rental are
substantially bigger.
One concern is that the subsample of contracts for which we have estimated trac delay costs
is not representative of our full sample. To address this, we use propensity score re-weighting.
First, we use a probit to estimate the probability that a contract is in the subsample given
contract size, duration and type of contract. Second, we weight the relevant counterfactual
statistics for each observation in the subsample by the inverse of the estimated probability
of inclusion. If the unobservables have the same distribution across the full sample and
subsample, this will correct for selection. Looking at the bottom panel of Table 7 we see
that the results are similar in percentage terms, though smaller in magnitude. For example,
the welfare gain from increasing the penalty is predicted to be $39,000 per contract, or 2.9%.
We also report the standard deviation of the penalties paid by contractors, across produc-
tivity and error draws. While the mean penalty is just a transfer from the contractor to
the procurer and doesn't enter welfare calculations even under risk aversion, the standard
22deviation is a measure of the riskiness of the contract, and matters. We nd that these are
in general pretty comparable across the rst four policies, although they sharply increase in
the case of the fully ecient lane rental. To put the magnitude into context, the $47,000
standard deviation in payments from the full lane rental means that if the contractor has a
markup of 10% on the average $1.3 million contract, nearly a third of their prot could be
wiped out by a one standard deviation negative shock. This might be a barrier to entry for
small rms.
Discussion: How reasonable are our estimates? To get a sense of this, we compare our
results with those in Lewis and Bajari (2011). That paper examines what happened when
the California Department of Transportation oered stronger time incentives through the
use of scoring auctions. When the time incentives oered were equivalent to a lane rental
of roughly $14,000 per day on much bigger contracts (nearly $22M on average), contractors
completed in approximately 60% of the allotted time. Our most ambitious counterfactual |
the ecient lane rental | predicts that lane rentals of similar magnitude (around $15,000
per day) applied to much smaller contracts $1.8M in our delay subsample) would have bigger
eects (43% completion time). This doesn't seem entirely unreasonable, which is re-assuring.
Our rst conclusion is that using a standardized set of time penalties, as Mn/DOT does, is
far from optimal. As we showed, by setting contract-specic penalties |without changing
deadlines or the average penalty | there could be a welfare gain of 1.9% of contract value.
For our full sample, this amounts to $15.2 million. So our rst conclusion is that tailored
incentives would have a substantial quantitative impact on total welfare.
There is also broad heterogeneity in the ex-post marginal benets of delay across contractors,
both because of ex-ante asymmetries in their production functions, and ex-post productivity
shocks. Because of this, contractors would sometimes be willing to nish early if incentivized
to do so. The ecient lane rentals give such an incentive, and therefore produce much higher
welfare gains | for our sample, a projected gain of $199.5 million. Our second conclusion
then is that time incentives really should be structured to provide a constant incentive for
accelerated construction.
There are some important limitations of the above analysis. In some cases we are relying
on the functional form of the parametric model. This is particularly true of the lane rental
policy, where the marginal benets of delay prior to the contract deadline are inferred based
on the slope  of that function, which in turn was identied from late contracts. If the slope
23is not constant (e.g. marginal benets are decreasing) we may underestimate the benets to
delay, and hence overestimate the eectiveness of the policy. To address these concerns we
have mainly focused on small counterfactual policy changes, so that if the function is locally
linear around e d = 1, our estimates will be approximately correct.
We also ignore the fact that under the new contract regime, contractors may be selected for on
the basis of their ability to complete quickly, and therefore the winning bidders may actually
have lower marginal costs than those we estimated earlier (although they may have higher
xed costs). Moreover, they may make dierent decisions with respect to the hiring of labor
and rental of capital than they currently do, enabling them to complete quicker without
incurring the high costs we project when we hold labor and capital decisions xed. This
suggests we may underestimate the welfare gains from more high-powered time incentives.
But with these incentives comes an increased need for monitoring the contractors. This
may be costly, since Mn/DOT would have to employ additional personnel on site. At least
for the small changes considered here, this seems unlikely to be necessary. Finally, we do
not account for general equilibrium eects due to the bidding up of input prices, or for the
potential deadweight loss incurred in raising the funds for this accelerated procurement.
6 Conclusion
Blunt instruments can sometimes be eective tools. Time incentives are a relatively blunt
instrument: instead of contracting on all the events that may require a contractor to adapt
his plans, the contract simply species a deadline and penalties. What this paper has shown
is that these incentives are sucient to motivate adaptation, at least when the design needn't
be amended.
Nonetheless, even blunt instruments need to be designed with care. As the paper has shown,
thoughtful deadlines are meaningless without appropriate penalties. In regulating the ex-
ternality from highway construction, penalties that are proportional to the trac delay cost
perform much better than a \one-size-ts-all" statewide policy.
This paper has focused on highway contracts, because they are cases where the design is
close to fully specied and adaptation is generally one-sided. This leaves room for interesting
empirical research on cases where the design itself may need adaptation in the face of a shock,
such as in military procurement or less routine construction.
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7 Appendix
Table 1: Damage Specications and Time Outcomes
Damages per day ($) Time Outcomes
Contract Value ($) 1995-2004 2005- # Obs # Late
Below 25K 75 150 1 0
25K-50K 125 300 6 0
50K-100K 250 300 22 0
100K-500K 500 600 145 36
500K-1M 750 1000 102 38
1M-2M 1250 1500 118 50
2M-5M 1750 2000 73 34
5M-10M 2500 3000 23 15
Damage specications are taken from the Mn/DOT standard specications for construction contracts. These
were last amended in 2005. Time outcomes are based on the diary data.
27Table 2: Summary Statistics: Mn/DOT Highway Construction Contracts, 1996-2006
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Contract Value (thousands) 1336.1 1551.7 15.84 9549.7
Days Allowed 40.61 30.05 10 198
Days Taken 43.48 37.40 5.900 271
Planned Hours 391.7 313.1 80 1946.0
Hours Worked 462.5 453.6 29 3290
Avoidable Delays (hours) 70.03 100.2 0 808
Unavoidable Delays (hours) 99.10 142.9 0 1099
Work Rate (hours/day) 10.18 3.470 1.840 24
Contract late? 0.353 0.478 0 1
Penalty applied if late? 0.243 0.430 0 1
Damages (if applied) 6097.8 6036.6 500 27000
Types of Work (not mutually exclusive)
Beautication 0.0306 0.172 0 1
Bridge Repair 0.104 0.306 0 1
Construction 0.0776 0.268 0 1
Resurfacing 0.898 0.303 0 1
Shoulders / Turn Lanes 0.192 0.394 0 1
Trac Signals 0.137 0.344 0 1
Delay Subsample
Daily Trac 11688.1 15960.0 380 100000
Projected delay (mins) 9.727 7.115 0 20
Daily Trac Delay Cost 15164.7 20492.6 0 124000
Number of contracts 490
Summary statistics for selected highway construction contracts let by the Minnesota Department of Trans-
portation between 1996 and 2006. The sample includes all working day contracts for which we have diary
data (20 percent of all contracts). The omitted type of work category is "other". "Unavoidable" delays are
those that were outside of the contractor's control; "avoidable" delays are those that were preventable in the
judgement of the project engineer. "Beautication" work includes landscaping, painting and minor repairs.
The delay subsample consists of 99 contracts for which we collected more detailed data on detour options,
and projected a daily cost to commuters from trac delays.
28Table 3: Shocks and Work Rate Adaptation
Work Rate
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shock 0.560*** 0.533*** 0.404*** 0.271***
(0.049) (0.057) (0.103) (0.102)
Planned Work Rate 0.777*** 0.777*** 0.647*** 0.545***
(0.066) (0.077) (0.104) (0.114)
Time Penalty / Days Allowed 0.012* 0.018* 0.017** 0.007
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011)
Contract Value / (Days Allowed * 1000) 0.010 0.040***
(0.009) (0.013)
Big Firm 0.239 -0.010
(0.214) (0.250)
In-State Contractor 0.159 0.073
(0.328) (0.323)
N 490 490 490 490
First-stage F-statistic - - 29.48 20.94
District/Work/Year FE no yes no yes
The dependent variable is the work rate in hours per day. The shock variable is the dierence between
actual and planned hours, divided by the days allowed. Big Firm is a dummy variable indicating that the
contracting rm won more than $10 million of contracts over the sample period. The rst two columns report
results from an OLS regression, while the last two report results from an IV regression where the contract
shock is instrumented for by the hours of rain and hours of snow per day. Columns (2) and (4) include
year, type of work and district xed eects. Standard errors are robust. Signicance levels are denoted by
asterisks (* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01). The F-statistic reported for the IV regressions is from an
F-test of the joint signicance of the instruments.
29Table 4: Determinants of Late Contract Completion
Indicator for Contract Late
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time Penalty / Days Allowed -0.004** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Contract Value / (Days Allowed * 1000) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Big Firm -0.054 -0.026
(0.045) (0.045)
In-State Contractor 0.100 0.080
(0.061) (0.058)
Hours of rain per day 0.553***
(0.148)
Hours of snow per day 1.509*
(0.772)
N 490 490 490 490
R2 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.21
District/Work/Year FE no yes yes yes
The dependent variable is the probability that the contract is completed late. All columns are OLS regres-
sions, and standard errors are robust. Signicance levels are denoted by asterisks (* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05,
*** p < 0:01). Big Firm is a dummy variable indicating a rm that won more than $10M in total contract
value in the sample. Marginal eects from a probit specication are very similar.
30Table 5: Estimates of Marginal Benet of Delay
Days Taken / Days Allowed
Full Enforcement Random Enforcement
Raw Coecients
Log Contract Size (1) -4.49 -2.59 -2.08 -0.81
( 3.85) ( 3.50) ( 4.55) ( 1.41)
Planned Work Rate (2) 8.29*** 6.87*** 6.76*** 2.08***
( 1.95) ( 1.76) ( 1.83) ( 0.58)
Big Firm (3) 2.23 1.56 1.03 -0.73
( 9.55) ( 6.79) ( 7.61) ( 2.96)
In-State Contractor (4) 0.26 -2.90 -5.06 -3.32
( 6.08) ( 6.24) ( 6.62) ( 2.01)
Shock () 13.00*** 12.14*** 12.15*** 3.65***
( 1.85) ( 1.69) ( 1.70) ( 0.54)
Slope () -238.75*** -221.89*** -221.84*** -68.69***
( 42.02) ( 38.95) ( 39.26) ( 11.89)
Std. Deviation of Error () 78.57*** 70.23*** 70.18*** 21.63***
( 10.23) ( 8.80) ( 8.81) ( 2.66)
Estimated Benet Function for an Average Contract
Intercept 11037.23 10184.37 10191.13 3122.82
( 1827.26) ( 1707.88) ( 1736.87) ( 529.21)
Slope -9695.28 -9010.46 -9008.54 -2789.39
( 1706.28) ( 1581.77) ( 1594.24) ( 483.03)
Std. Deviation of Productivity Shock 3458.23 3230.15 3232.69 971.72
( 492.17) ( 449.11) ( 452.71) ( 142.86)
Std. Deviation of Error 3190.40 2851.97 2859.30 881.02
( 415.28) ( 357.39) ( 422.18) ( 124.39)
District FEs no yes yes yes
Maximum likelihood estimates of the marginal benet of delay function. The top panel has the raw co-
ecients; the bottom panel shows the implied function for an average contract. An average contract has
value $1.3M, should be completed in 40 days and has a penalty of $1K per day. In the third and fourth
columns, the standard deviation of the error term is specied as a linear function of the log contract size.
The rst three columns are from a model that assumes full enforcement of the time penalties; the last column
assumes random enforcement, with the probability of enforcement estimated as a function of the contract
characteristics. Big Firm is a dummy variable indicating a rm that won more than $10M in total contract
value in the sample. The standard deviation of the productivity shock indicates the eect of a 1 standard
deviation increase in the required hours of work per day on the marginal benet of delay for an average
contract. District xed eects are included where indicated. Standard errors are bootstrapped. Asterisks in
the top panel denote signicance levels (* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01).
31Table 6: Sample and Simulated Moments
Data Simulations
Mean Mean Std. Error 95% L.B. 95% U.B.
Days Taken / Days Allowed 1.04 1.03 0.01 1.01 1.05
Days Taken / Days Allowed if value >$1M 1.10 1.11 0.02 1.07 1.14
Days Taken / Days Allowed if value <$1M 1.00 0.97 0.01 0.94 1.00
Fraction of Contracts Late 0.37 0.45 0.02 0.42 0.48
Fraction Late if value >$1M 0.50 0.54 0.02 0.50 0.58
Fraction Late if value <$1M 0.28 0.39 0.02 0.34 0.43
Days Taken / Days Allowed if late 1.33 1.26 0.02 1.22 1.30
Days Taken / Days Allowed if late & value >$1M 1.30 1.30 0.03 1.25 1.35
Days Taken / Days Allowed if late & value <$1M 1.36 1.23 0.03 1.18 1.29
Structural Model OLS
Simulated R2 for days taken 0.87 0.66
Comparison of observed and simulated moments. The rst column contains moments observed in the data; the second
column contains moments simulated using the maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters. Columns 3|5
respectively contain the bootstrapped standard errors, and lower and upper bounds of a 95% condence interval for these
moments. The bottom part of the table shows a simulated R2 for days taken, computed from the total sum of squares
and residual sum of squares, where the residuals are the dierence between the observed and mean simulated outcome.
The OLS comparison uses OLS to predict the days taken, using all the covariates from the structural model (including a
constant).
32Table 7: Counterfactual Welfare Estimates under Alternative Policies
Current 10% Tighter New Penalties Lane Rental Lane Rental
Policy Deadline (10% Delay Cost) (10% Delay Cost) (100% Delay Cost)
Subsample with Delay Data
Days Taken 46.84 46.33 46.91 43.57 20.02
(45.52,48.26) (45.03,47.80) (45.63,48.28) (42.04,45.42) (17.48,23.63)
Commuter Gain ($K) 64.73 73.92 118.57 274.16 790.88
(45.09,85.00) (52.17,97.01) (88.19,148.23) (195.84,347.80) (726.19,844.13)
Acc. Cost ($K) 2.58 2.96 4.71 13.23 184.31
(1.81,3.38) (2.11,3.87) (3.61,5.78) (9.68,16.34) (168.08,207.04)
Penalties Paid ($K) 13.06 17.19 8.95 62.82 111.49
(10.54,16.06) (14.56,20.34) (7.03,11.74) (56.77,69.76) (85.59,157.57)
Std. Dev. Penalties ($K) 15.95 17.93 12.72 26.50 67.69
(13.01,18.68) (14.99,20.61) (10.19,15.82) (22.33,29.93) (55.25,90.63)
Net Gain ($K) 62.16 70.96 113.85 260.93 606.57
(43.26,81.62) (50.08,93.12) (84.44,142.62) (186.14,331.48) (525.23,666.29)
Reweighted to match full sample
Days Taken / Allowed 41.51 41.07 41.58 38.67 19.56
(40.57,42.62) (40.13,42.25) (40.64,42.66) (37.52,40.09) (17.70,22.18)
Commuter Gain ($K) 45.60 52.29 86.08 201.11 583.68
(31.62,60.57) (36.84,68.60) (63.47,107.13) (142.66,256.50) (538.10,618.51)
Acc. Cost ($K) 1.85 2.14 3.44 9.76 132.55
(1.29,2.44) (1.52,2.81) (2.68,4.19) (7.08,12.15) (119.83,151.84)
Penalties Paid ($K) 9.64 12.75 6.22 46.30 80.48
(7.76,11.64) (10.90,14.87) (4.94,7.96) (42.06,51.43) (64.69,110.23)
Std. Dev. Penalties ($K) 12.05 13.62 9.21 19.96 47.05
(9.94,13.96) (11.46,15.51) (7.42,11.20) (16.71,22.34) (38.83,62.56)
Net Gain ($K) 43.75 50.15 82.63 191.35 451.13
(30.34,58.14) (35.32,65.78) (60.77,102.83) (135.58,244.35) (392.99,494.23)
Counterfactual welfare results under dierent policies. The top panel of results is estimated using the data subsample for which
we have social cost measures; the second panel imputes counterfactual results for the full sample by reweighting the counterfactual
moments for each contract by the inverse of the probability of appearing in the subsample. This probability is estimated by a
probit, conditioning on the observables used elsewhere in the paper. The rst column is simulated outcomes under the current
policy. In the second column, the contract deadline is accelerated by 10%. In the third, the daily penalties for late completion are
set equal to 10% of the trac delay cost. In the fourth and fth columns, a lane rental policy is simulated, with rental rates equal
to 10% and 100% of the trac delay cost respectively. All statistics are calculated relative to a scenario where no time incentives
are used. For example, \Commuter Gain" for any contract is the average number of days saved by using time incentives times
the trac delay cost. \Acceleration Cost" is the estimated additional cost to the winning contractor of accelerating construction
relative to a no time incentives scenario. \Penalties" refers to any penalties the contractor pays, \Std. Dev Penalties" is the
standard deviation of those penalties across simulated draws of productivity and cost shocks (averaged over contracts), while
\Net Gain" is the dierence between commuter gain and contractor acceleration costs. In all cases, mean results are averaged
across simulations and contracts. 95% condence intervals are given in parentheses, and are generated by bootstrapping the
regressions and taking the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the simulated results based on the bootstrapped coecients.
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